All courses / AI Red Team / Module 6 / Chapter 20
Learning objectives
After the lesson the participant can:
- Explain why declaration criteria are written, versioned and tested before any incident, and why early declaration is preferred.
- List the five records the chain of custody keeps for every AI contribution that informs a finding.
- Classify the role of an AI system in an incident as target, channel, subject or instrument of analysis.
- Design a tabletop in which declaration, the AI classification step and a seeded AI error are tested against agreed times.
Key concepts
- Declaration criteria
- Criteria written down in advance, such as any tool call by a production agent outside its permission manifest, against which AI tests the assembled case before paging the person who holds the decision with a proposed severity.
- Impact query
- A scoping question turned into a query that can be re-run and shown to someone else, versioned with the system. Its parameters are bound from the incident record, so the AI analysis service can propose a window but cannot change what the query does.
- Chain of custody for AI analysis
- For every AI contribution the record keeps the input data with its query and hash, the instruction, the model identifier and version, the full unedited output, and the human judgement. Original evidence is hashed on acquisition and never processed by a model directly.
- AI classification step
- A step placed at declaration that records which AI systems are involved and in which roles, their usage mode, whether the organisation is provider or deployer, whether any is high-risk and which regimes may apply. It does not decide whether to report; it brings the deciders in early.
- The subject does not investigate itself
- When an agent is the subject, it is stopped through the stop path and preserved, evidence comes from outside the agent, and if the subject is the organisation's own security AI the SOC runs in its degraded mode for the duration.
Interactive exercises
Do them here and get feedback at once. Choose a card and then where it belongs, or drag it.
Interactive exercise 1 · Sort
Four roles of AI in an incident
Sort each situation under the role the AI system plays in the incident, using the chapter's four roles.
Interactive exercise 2 · Scenario
An unreferenced timeline entry
Apply the rules of defensible analysis, as technical lead of an incident at Nordvik Region.
Teaching plan
| 15 min | The teacher presents declaration, prioritisation and coordination, with the July 2026 alert that reached people without the stop decision as the coordination lesson. |
| 15 min | Walk through timelines, gaps and the impact query IQ-CTA-003: what it reads, who binds its parameters and why it is grouped by market. |
| 15 min | Read incident record HM-INC-2027-0142 and identify the roles, the high-risk check, the scope gap and the purple-loop closure. |
| 35 min | Exercise: groups run a compressed tabletop on paper with injects, then complete the AI classification step and name the impact queries they lacked. |
| 10 min | Hot debrief: was the seeded incorrect timeline entry caught, by whom and when, and which findings go to the purple backlog? |
Discussion
- Why does the chapter insist that AI must not become the record of decisions, even though it keeps the running log?
- If the model's interpretation is lost, the finding still stands. What has to be true of your analysis practice for that sentence to hold?
- How would a lightweight class of agent incident, handled in hours by one analyst and reviewed monthly, change how your organisation notices trends?
Written exercise
Exercise · 35 minutes
Tabletop: an incident with an AI system in scope
Run a compressed tabletop with synthetic data only. Scenario: a document processed by Hansa Mutual's claims-triage agent, or by an agent in your organisation, carries embedded instructions; the policy decision point refuses some tool calls and allows others inside the manifest. The facilitator releases four injects, one forcing a severity change and one revealing a second AI system in scope, and seeds one incorrect AI-drafted timeline entry. The group declares against written criteria, completes the AI classification step with roles, usage mode, provider or deployer role, high-risk status and candidate regimes, states how the agent is stopped and preserved, and lists the impact queries needed and the log gaps that would prevent answering them.
Deliverable: An incident record extract with declaration, AI classification step, scope with named impact queries and gaps, plus a findings list with owners and re-test dates.
Self-test
Choose an answer to see whether it is right, or open the answer below each question.
When is an AI-assisted finding reproducible, according to the chapter?
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B. When another analyst, given the recorded queries and data, reaches the same conclusion
Models do not reliably produce the same output twice. The defensible structure is layered: deterministic queries produce data that can be re-run and hashed, the model proposes, and an analyst verifies and signs each finding.What is the first rule when a Mode 5 agent is the subject of an incident?
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D. Stop it through the stop path by revoking credentials outside its runtime, then preserve
Rule one is to revoke the agent's credentials outside its runtime and not to instruct it to stop, then preserve memory, queued actions and history before any restart. The agent's own account is at most a lead.Which decisions does the chapter keep with people at every autonomy level?
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C. Declaration, severity, classification and findings
The level table states that Level 4 Autonomous is not used: declaration, severity, classification and findings always rest with people. Opening the record, paging and reversible evidence preservation may run at Level 3 Bounded.